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Revolution and Reproduction:
Or How Revolutionary Elites Contribute to Institutional Model-Dependence in the World-System


Not always wrongly though, the idea of revolution leads us to think of socio-political processes in terms of radical systemic shifts and ruptures which often deserve to be considered as turning-points in history. A revolution by definition is a radical process in which old social forces and institutions were challenged and eventually replaced by the new ones, a process which also introduces a new generation of political elites into the scene. In that sense a revolution is also a process in which the matrix of elite formation is heavily influenced not only in terms of social backgrounds of political figures but also in terms of their Weltanschauungs, strategies and institutional priorities. However despite emphases on this side of revolutions, the thing that needs remembering is that such breaks do not take place in totally isolated terrains and under totally improvised conditions. This paper will point out the fact that neither revolutionary elite’s repertoire of revolutionary strategies, nor their objectives of post-revolutionary institutional restructuring can be understood without a reference to the world system; a system in the broadest sense of the term comprises not only various sets of economic relations, but also political elite’s lexicon of revolutionary strategies and institutional reforms. This also suggests that revolutionary elites are not exempt from being influenced by past experiences, institutional models and current global waves. Although revolutions can by no means be reduced to elite-led social processes, and cannot be explained without the role of classes, i.e. peasantry, working class or bourgeoisie, in the reproduction of institutions the role of elites and their social capital is obvious: a capital which is formed in constant interaction with intellectual and political currents in the world-system. My paper, departing from the Ottoman-Turkish context, will try to understand how revolutionary elites adopt certain institutional models, and by doing so eventually reproduce certain models in the world-system in their own contexts. My paper will also try to produce some comparative evidence from other societies to show how revolutionary elites contribute to model-dependence.

I. Some Introductory Remarks on the Concept of Institutional Model-Dependence

If we were able to talk about the grammar of modernity, in the sense Fernand Braudel talked about ‘the grammar of civilizations’ , probably the next step would take us to the issue of ‘the multiple models and grammars of modernity’ . Although modernity evolved as an aspect of Western civilization, it has not remained limited to a single representation of the West. On the contrary models of modernity continued to diversify and multiply in Western and non-Western societies by giving rise to what were usually alternative and contesting patterns. These models were comprised of the diversities and commonalities of modernity, and to the extent they gradually as emerged relatively crystallised experiences at national contexts, they began to be appropriated by the ruling elites and intellectuals of non-Western societies. Thus these models of modernity came forth as sub-paradigmatic elements of modernization. As successive waves of political ideas spreading outwards from the West made a remarkable impact on the elites of non-Western world, those models of modernity became the indispensable components of modernizing elites’ macro-strategies. The dissemination of images and institutions of modernity throughout the world thus further contributed to the processes of socio-political reproduction and articulation. Through new cognitive-cultural instruments inspired by the European/Western modernities, the Western institutions began to interact and later articulate with non-Western, non-modern and non-capitalist societies. This also suggests that ‘a form of world time’ through which political activists, oversees entrepreneurs, military leaders and modernising elites frequently –deliberately or not- interact with has a definitive effect on the patterns of political actions . Although this is not to suggest that the whole aspects of traditional institutions were dissolved or progressively replaced by new institutions in a fully voluntaristic fashion, but it does not mean that such resonances are of minor significance for understanding the global patterns of circulation, interaction and articulations of ideas, institutions, policies and strategies. On the contrary, appropriation of the models of modernity via transnational contexts usually entails ‘the continuous selection, reinterpretation, and reformulation of these imported ideas’ , a process of constant adjustment and adaptation at all levels. But the question of how Western models of modernity eventually transform the periphery and semi-periphery of the world system needs to be answered in these cases separately. This introductory examination seeks some preliminary answers to this question by attributing similar significance to domestic as well as international dynamics that influence various sections of modernizing elites and intellectuals in their adoption and adaptation of Western models of modernity, their macro strategies, repertoire and instruments. Incorporation and articulation of the model(s) of modernity into characteristically different economic-cultural geographies, thus, paves way a complex and multi-layered process of change in the world system.

In this paper I aim to utilise a historical sociological approach to model-dependence in the case of Ottoman-Turkish modernisation. By panoramically scanning the late Ottoman and early Republican periods up to mid 1940s, I would like to draw attention to a neglected theoretical dimension that is modelic foundations of Turkish modernization and modelic repertoires of the modernizing elite in Turkey. One of my starting premises is that modernization is about modernizing elites and the process of elite formation as much as it is about the macro-processes of social transformation. In a semi-peripheral society where the working class formation is in its infantile stage and the majority of population comprised of small peasants was occupied with agriculture, bureaucracy would inevitably emerge not only as the only organised social class , but also as a form of Bonapartism where Bonapart was no longer a person but a collective apparatus, be the core circles of reformist bureaucrats or the party of modernizing elite, responsible for the whole course of capitalist modernization and nation building. In the Ottoman-Turkish historical setting we can argue that military-bureaucratic elite inspires a structural-institutional definition of collective Bonapartism. In that sense, the concept of modernization implies at least a three-fold change, a) transformation of the ruling elite and the cultural fundamentals of collective apparatus which went hand in hand with different models of modernity and strategies of Westernization, b) transformation of state apparatus and certain institutions including the military organisation and technologies, administrative, political and legal systems etc., and c) transformation of economic and social structures, production methods and cultural traditions etc. In sum, these three dimensions of modernization appear to link elite formation, state formation and social formation of a given society. So far as the global waves of modelic influences, which spread Western national models to the periphery and semi-periphery of the world system, are concerned, thus we can talk about a multi-faceted interaction between models of modernity and the fields of experiment/experience of modernization. This dimension links non-Western social structures, institutions and elites with models of modernity .

Although the theoretical implications of model-dependence is beyond the scope of this study, and deserves to be addressed separately particularly with reference to the rich literature on path-dependence, it suffices to state here that what I refer to as ‘model-dependence’ is about overdetermined transformation of certain aspects of non-Western societies. This is a process of overdetermination in the sense that the contradictions of underdevelopment of various type in those societies were thought to be surpassed by alternative reform programs inspired from external models of modernity . Political and economic interventions of modernising elite to compensate for the gap, thus, go hand in hand with the introduction of exogenous patterns and strategies. It is a process in which macro-institutional changes were introduced in order to overcome endogenous incapacities. Such historic leaps could be concretised in two alternative ways or as a combination of both in underdeveloped societies or in colonies, a) by predominantly international dynamics such as strong capitalist states’ military and diplomatic interventions into the domestic sphere, or b) by self-motivated national modernizing elites, reformist projects. Yet in both cases what is intended to be overcome is unevenness of socio-political backwardness. Therefore in the sense modernization is called ‘modernization/revolution from above’, this is also ‘a modernization from outside’ as the source of inspiration and the institutional patterns to be followed come from external socio-political units as a result of uneven yet combined development in the world system.

In our case of Ottoman-Turkish modernization too the projects of macro-transformation comes from either through international dynamics or through vanguard modernizing elites, but in either case the reference of change is formulated via models of modernity. From whichever channel they are formulated, these projects create immense institutional outcomes in modernising societies. It is in the sense that the sets of decisions taken by the modernizing elites with reference to models of modernity have affected the state formation in particular and social formation in general. But to stress unilateral effect of these models does not mean to exaggerate the role of state intervention and elite’s strategies, neither to prioritise political dynamics vis-à-vis the limits of social and economic structures. Avoiding a discussion on crude polarisation between political voluntarism and economic determinism, I should like to stress that though modernization is an overdetermined process in which certain institutions of modernity play significant role, whether modernizing elite’s strategies of speeding up industrialisation, institutional rationalisation and nation formation etc. are destined to achieve expected outcomes is still unknown. Political solutions trying to overcome socio-economic underdevelopment and contradictions in a given society are not necessarily destined to succeed. In each case, such attempts should historically and theoretically be tested.

In this paper what I find rather significant is as much as the causes of the shortcomings of model-dependent modernization, how the reproduction of ‘the Western models of modernity’ in developing world took place and what the articulation of modern institutions and non-Western social structures meant for macro-social chance. As will be elaborated in the following paragraphs, ‘models of modernity’ refer to macro-systemic designs which correspond relatively distinct political, constitutional, economic and cultural etc. formations that were crystallised in some national contexts and therefore began to represent different pathways within modernity -with particular reference to state/civil society formation, authoritarianism/democratization, nation formation, capitalist development and class/elite formation etc. Once certain pathways were crystallised and established as a model with one of their prominent and successful characteristics, these experiences come forth as models, pathways or macro-strategies, which inspire the purposeful and instrumental strategies for the modernizing elites of the developing world. By focusing on the modelic inspirations of macro-scale social and institutional change in the late Ottoman and early Republican contexts, my analysis will try to show how ‘early models of modernity’ influenced institutional-systemic change in a semi-peripheral social formation and how the cognitive tool-boxes of the ruling elites were shaped through these models . Focusing the turn of the 19th century in the Ottoman and Republican contexts, I will primarily focus on the patterns of institutional modernization, nation building, strategies of capitalist development and elite formation. Although this study will primarily focus on the Turkish case, by examining the modelic foundations of Turkish modernization at the cross-road of post-imperial transition, I will imply that the Turkish case is far from exceptional in many terms , and the analysis of model-dependence might have implications for other geographies from the Middle East to Latin America, from South East Asia to East Europe and Central Asia. My assumption is that these models of modernity –either adopted partially and selectively and/or totally- operate as mechanisms of transmission between social-political formations in the world system. Whether we formulate this transmission process with theories of path-dependence or the spread of global waves, what seems to be rather crucial is how these models appropriated and articulated in a given socio-political setting by the ruling elites . In that regard, Turkish experience suggests that models of modernity play a significant role in shaping both ruling elites’ strategies and the institutional framework of modernization in general. At first sight my emphasis on the modernizing elites and their role in laying the grounds for institutional reforms in the Ottoman-Turkish context might give the impression that social and economic structures were left outside of the analysis. Such an objection is not unfounded, if this papers does not confine itself to the initial stage of modelic reproduction. The questions such under what kind of historical condition imported models, institutions and strategies succeed or fail to produce what their expected of, and how such models concretely interact with local-domestic structures will be left unanswered as they need to be addressed separately. But historically there is strong reason to focus on the modernizing elites and their cognitive-cultural formations, because in many cases the ruling elites emerge as one of the most organised groups, if not the only one, and in the Ottoman-Turkish context probably as in other cases of semi-peripheral development, the bureaucratic elite with its civilian and military wings, had unprecedented weight on the social-political system as the majority of the population was rural and the working class formation was in its primitive stages.

As a result to the extent modelic influences are articulated within the initial conditions of a given society, this further leads to the hybridisation of institutional structures. Either in the case of old empires or nation states or former colonies, such modelic influences seem to have paved the way to processes of constant appropriation, imitation and articulation in the world system. From the Russian to the Ottoman and Japanese cases throughout the 19th century, from Peter the Great in Russia to Sultan Mahmud II in the Ottoman Empire and the Meiji in Japan autocratic monarchs and westernised intellectuals created various portfolios of reform proposals to transform their societies in accordance with models of modernity. Undoubtedly this led to a constant interaction between semi-peripheral social structures and global models. With the help of the circulation of reformist and counter-reformist ideas, the ruling elites gained more opportunities to get familiar with certain aspects of these models. From political institutions to development strategies, from architecture to fine arts, from military techniques to legal-administrative reforms, many aspects of modernization –both in the West and outside- were shaped by these images of modernity . To the extent the global networks of information were extended for the dissemination/circulation of the models and their distinct strategies, the appropriation of ideas by the modernizing elites became possible in the national contexts.

Partly due to the mounting problems of the empire and partly due to the incessant attempts to reform the Ottoman society, throughout the 19th century the Ottoman ruling elite related itself with Europe with feelings of confusion, agony and helplessness . As modernity posed radical challenges to the Ottoman mindset, both political and social backwardness forced the ruling elites to reform their societies as much as the Habsburg, the Chinese and the Russian empires were forced to, albeit in different ways. The revolutionary face of modern times posed harsh challenges to the Ottoman mindset. Faced with those challenges, the Ottoman ruling elite was frightened as much as fascinated by the modern age, and hesitantly sought the most adequate model of modernity to appropriate. Although the Ottoman-Turkish elites’ search for appropriated models looks haphazard and disoriented in many cases since the elite copied –partially or totally- many institutions and legal traditions from Western societies such as France, Britain, Prussia, Switzerland, the United State, Italy, Soviet Union and Japan. Again at first sight, the process of modelic reception may look quite eclectic and disorganised, in fact in many cases are, but a systematic look at the modelic impacts on Ottoman-Turkish modernization suggest that these influences have cumulative effects and far from casually cluttered.

A historical sociological assessment, we will argue that, can reveal how through mainly two significant models of modernity that Ottoman Turkish modernization proceeded, and how the ruling elites’ repertoire of modernity shaped the trajectory of the whole process of macro transformations via various diplomatic, cultural and ideological interactions. From the early 19th century to the mid-20th century, an analysis of model-dependence will retrospectively map out the modelic influences behind the Ottoman-Turkish modernization. These models, in many terms, can be seen as roadmaps which are utilised in designing institutional reforms. And as the whole Turkish experience come to appear to be a model-dependent modernization during last two centuries, we can further argue that the search for the most adequate models of modernization has become the raison d’étre of the ruling elite . Via the analysis of model-dependence, I intend to provide some theoretical insights to understand the cognitive backgrounds of Turkish modernization. These influences, in return, will also reveal the components of what is known as ‘the Turkish model of modernization’ . As a semi-peripheral case, the Turkish experience of model-dependence prompts us to think that models of modernity fulfil a decisive role in drawing the outlines of modernization. Approaches that merely prioritise local structures tend to underrate the hierarchical interdependence in the world system, and neglect both political-strategic and ideological-cultural components of macro-changes and the relational feature of the world system. And so far as the process of modelic appropriation is concerned, it appears to be a continuous process in which the competition between major and minor models directly influences intra-elite struggles and vice versa.

From the viewpoint of elite’s choice of certain modelic objective and strategies, we should add another significant dimension to our discussion on model-dependence, that the choice of a particular model is not a free-choice and determined by various factors. First, model-dependence is not simply an outcome of voluntary decision-making of the ruling elite. But model-dependence is concretised as a result of the interaction between global hegemonic processes and elite’s decision making capacities. By considering the competition between models of modernity as part of global struggle for hegemony, I mean that circulation of such models is part of power struggles between states in the centre of world system. International dynamics of military and economic competition and geo-political conditions had decisive role on how far certain models could circulate, as these nations tried to limit their rivals’ effects and increase their own on relatively less developed parts of the world system . In many cases, the modernizing elites were exposed –semi-voluntarily and involuntarily- to certain models of modernity. Neither the state nor their position within the state was free of external determinations, though ruling military-bureaucratic elites enjoyed a certain level of autonomy, manoeuvrability of their states was nevertheless confined with military and economic conditions of the international system . For that reason, the dynamics that affected the accessibility and availability of models of modernity for the state elites were Janus-faced. From geographical to cultural difficulties, from international systems of military alliances to the nature of colonial experience, from certain affinities between elites to linguistic barriers, many factors could play supportive or obstructive role in the dissemination and adoption of models. Therefore it would be voluntaristic to suggest that the modernizing elites enjoyed unlimited autonomy in deciding which path(s) of modernization to take or which strategies of capitalist development to follow. On the contrary these models were not only chosen, but more than often were imposed on several societies and elites. For example the history of imperialism as strongly linked with the colonial experience of model-dependent modernization played a significant role in spreading the certain European institutions to the periphery of the world system. Therefore to the extent the popularity of a particular model was interlinked with international dynamics of competition, so was elite’s attachment to a certain models interlinked with intra-elite competition. Therefore the dynamics of contest/struggle between models continued at different levels. First the competitions took place at the intra-elite level regarding the political connotations of modernization repertoires . Second at inter-state level at which some states or societies align or detach themselves from others due to military, diplomatic, ideological and economic reasons. In sum, various globally circulating hegemonic models, besides creating the cognitive toolboxes of the ruling elites throughout the world, laid the grounds for interaction between domestic structures and prominent models of modernity.

Similar to their contemporaries, throughout the international power struggle the Ottoman Turkish elite too were exposed to the more advanced institutions of modernity. The more lagged behind her rivals, the more Ottoman state needed to emulate new military and administrative techniques. In the case of the Ottoman ruling elite, in contrast to colonies of the European states, we can talk about a relative autonomy for discretion of modernization strategies. But as we indicated above this autonomy was far from complete, and had been limited by both domestic social-economic restraints and international alliances and power struggles. Yet despite these, institutional changes came into being from the 19th century onwards as the French, German , Japanese, American and Soviet models entered the ruling elite’s and intellectuals’ lexicon of modernization, creating a set of macro-strategies and ideas reformist ideas. The Turkish reformers were no exception compared to other states’ elite in appropriating what they thought to be the most adequate path for progress. In the Turkish context, of these models, the first two, i.e. the French and Prussian models of modernity, have created hegemonic impacts compared to the rest. Due to international and domestic dynamics, both the late Ottoman and early Republican modernization efforts were marked by these models. Although historically the popularity of these models among the ruling elite was far from unilinear, and brought to substantial revisions, they nevertheless continued to shape the cognitive-cultural instruments of the Turkish ruling elite in particular and the process of modernization in general.

Of these two models, the French model, besides its civilizational characteristics, i.e. culture, architecture and literature, was represented with its centralised administrative, financial and military system as a model of a strong state tradition. During the Revolution the French model was further crystallised with the help of the ideals of ‘Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity’ as a case of anti-monarchism and anti-clericalism, in which masses’ staunch demand for sovereignty and self-determination impressed next generations of the world . France, in that regard, came to the fore not only as the cradle of modern civilization, but also as one of the leading examples of democracy in the making of which national bourgeoisie took active position. France after the Revolution began to represent not only the radical political ideas but also the rationalised and centralised system of administration. From the Code Napoleon and her administrative system, from its Laic education to its military and technological prowess, the French model of modernity inspired the ruling elites of the other states in different ways. The French Revolution created a further opportunity to rephrase the model. As Eric Hobsbawm points out that ‘those who proposed to make revolutions, and especially whose object was the fundamental transformation of the social order, were particularly inspired and influenced by the model of France’ . So far as the heritage of the French Revolution is concerned, ‘the French Revolution saw itself, far more than the American had, as a global phenomenon, the model and pioneer of the world’s destiny’ . The slogans of the French Revolution -Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité- successfully mobilised revolutionary intellectuals –be them nationalist or Communist- against autocratic regimes, monarchies, colonialist powers and the old empires. As we shall discuss below, neither the Young Turks nor the Republican elite were exceptions. The historical background of the French model differed from the Anglo-American and Prussian counterparts. The French perception of democracy, solidarist-nationalism and secularism differed from even other Western cases .

On the other hand, besides France with which the Ottomans set up the first diplomatic relations, and therefore became more exposed to her culture than any other nation of Europe, the Ottoman elite from the late 19th century onwards, came under the Prussian influence and its autocratic model of modernity. As the Ottoman elite out of diplomatic and military necessities neared to Germany, the predominance of the French modernity on the Ottoman modernization began to be counter-balanced. Wilhelm II’s rather unreserved policies towards the Ottomans, in contrast to those of Otto von Bismarck’s from 1880s onwards had given new characteristics to the Ottoman modernization and some institutions. The Prussian model, independent of what it initially meant to the Ottoman ruling elite and intellectuals, represented distinct state tradition, military formation, cultural traits and capitalist development with regard to the French modernity . In terms of its military-autocratic character and rather protectionist strategies of industrialisation, the Prussian model seems to have inspired some militarist and authoritarian regimes in the 20th century. Additionally the Herderian style of its nationalism also captivated the political imagination of the elites in the Far East, South Europe, Latin America and the Middle East . Romantic nationalism of the German type emerges as distinct from the French civic nationalism in many ways. The idea of organic community emphasized the self-determination of the Volksgeist and its idealised cultural, ethnic and linguistic heritage as opposed to French equivalent’s stress on territorial and political loyalty to the nation. On the other hand unlike the liberal and republican models of democracy which prioritise the public sphere open to citizens, the Prussian model in a quite conservative fashion presented a modernization strategy in the leadership of autocratic-military elites by offering a highly mobilised, disciplined and army-like society. It is also in terms of how individual rights were conceptualised these two cases differed. As the liberal-republican models favoured liberties, the Prussian tradition prioritised duties and obligations which were eventually supposed to serve the organic community, nation, state and its army. However, it is not my intention to give a detailed analysis of these models in this paper, partly for this had already been done competently by several historical sociologists and partly for such an analysis requires to be examined separately. In the following paragraphs I will try to delineate in what ways model-dependent modernization affected Turkish ruling elites’ political repertoire and the fate of the institutional reforms by primarily focusing on the French and Prussian models. By indicating dual modelic foundations of the Turkish modernization, I will attempt to map out the modelic infrastructure of Turkish modernization. Given the fact that these competing models predominantly shaped the ruling elite’s cognitive background of modernization at least until the end of the World War II, it is rather crucial to look at how modernization, elite formation and intra-elite relations were shaped by the French and Prussian models of modernity, and how this outcome was strongly linked with the dynamics of international system.

Braudel, F. ‘Uygarliklarin Grameri’, [The Grammar of Civilizations], translated from French by M.A.Kiliçbay, (Ankara, 1995), 27-60.
Eisenstadt, S. N. Multiple Modernities, Deadalus, (2000), 129(1), 1-30, Wittrock, B. Modernity: One, None, Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition, Deadalus, (2000), 129(1), 31-60.
Skocpol, T. States and Social Revolutions, (Cambridge, 1979), 23-4.
Eisenstadt, S. N. Multiple Modernities, Deadalus, (2000), 129(1), 15.
Keyder, Ç. State and Classes in Turkey, (London, 1987), 4.
Goldstone, J. Initial Conditions, General Laws, Path, Dependence, and Explanation in Historical Sociology, American Journal of Sociology, 104(3), (1998), 829-45; Sewell, W.H. Jr. A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency and Transformation, American Journal of Sociology, 98(1), (1992), 1-29; Mahoney, J. Path Dependence in Sociology, Theory and Society, 29, (2000), 507-548; Kiser, E. & Hechter, M. The Role of General Theory in Comparative-Historical Sociology, American Journal of Sociology, 97(1), (1991), 1-30; Kiser, E. & Hechter, M. The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics, American Journal of Sociology, 104(3), (1998), 785-816.
Theoretical implications of the Althusserian notion of overdermination needs to be further discussed separately with reference to model-dependence. For the original usage of the concept, Althusser, L. & Balibar, E. Reading Capital, (London, 1997), and Althusser, L. For Marx,( London, 1993), 87-116.
Eisenstadt, S.N. Patterns of Modernity, vol.I-II, (New York, 1987), and Eisenstadt, S.N. ‘Modernization and Conditions of Sustained Growth’, World Politics, vol. 16(4), (1964), 576-594. Greenfeld, L. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, (Cambridge and London, 1992); and for a rather classical work, Moore, B. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, (London, 1991); Huntington, S.P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (University of Oklahoma Press: 1991);
Dube, S.C. Modernization and Development: The Search for Alternative Paradigms, Zed Books, (Tokyo, 1988), 15-47.
For a general presentation of the term see: Worsley, P. ‘Models of the Modern World-System’, Theory, Culture & Society, 7(2-3), (1990), 83-95; Owen, R. (1998) ‘Ortadogu Perspektifinde Modernlestirmeci Projeler’, (in) Türkiye’de Modernlesme ve Ulusal Kimlik, (eds) S. Bozdogan & R. Kasaba, (Istanbul, 1998), 200-6.
Yapp attributes significance to the Ottoman model in influencing elite formation in the Near East prior to the French and British influences as mandatory states. Yapp, M.E. The Near East Since the First World War, (London, 1991), 3-5.
Sohrabi, N. ‘Global Waves, Local Actors: What the Young Turks Knew about Other Revolutions and Why It Mattered’, Comparative Study of Society and History, vol.44:1, (2002), 45-79.
Eisenstadt, S.N. ‘Transformation of Social Political, and Cultural Orders in Modernization’, American Sociological Review, vol. 30(5), (1965), 659-673.
Ortayli, I. Imparatorlugun En Uzun Yüzyili, (Istanbul, 1995).
Bozkurt, G. Bati Hukukunun Türkiye’de Benimsenmesi: Osmanli Devleti’nden Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ne Resepsiyon Süreci (1839-1939), (Ankara, 1996), 50.
In fact, by the 1930s the Turkish model whose main characteristics were laid by Kemal Atatürk left considerable influence on the mindset of the ruling elite of the Middle Eastern societies such as Reza Shah of Iran and Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan. Georgeon, F. ‘Kemalizm ve Islam Dunyasi (1919-1938): Bazi Isaret Taslari’, (in) Kemalizm ve Islam Dünyasi, (eds. I. Gökalp and F. Georgeon, (Istanbul, 1990), 39-40; Mango, A. (1993) The Turkish Model, Middle Eastern Studies, 29(4), 726-757. Gellner, E. ‘Ortadogu Perspektifinde Modernlestirmeci Projeler’, (in) Türkiye’de Modernlesme ve Ulusal Kimlik, (eds) Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba, (Istanbul, 1998), 188-99; for a very interesting comparative account of how the Turkish model was considered by the Middle Eastern and Islamic elites in the cases of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Algeria and Malaysia., see: Gökalp, I. & Georgeon, F., Kemalizm ve Islam Dünyasi, (Istanbul, 1990), 9-53.
Sewell, W.H. Jr. ‘Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflection on the French Case’, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 57/1, (1985), 57-85.
Skocpol, T. States and Social Revolutions, (Cambridge, 1979), 22-3.
Ibid., 24-5.
Bourdieu’s study on the State Nobility provides us with some insights concerning the elite schools’ influence on the field of power. In the case of Turkey, elite schools with different educational priorities and schemes –along with different language educations, i.e. French, English and German - affected the elite’s political and cultural backgrounds and eventually created striking contrasts in political strategies. Although this aspect remains untouched in Bourdieu’s work, Bourdieu. P. The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power, translated by L.C. Clough, (Oxford, 1996), additionally see: Mann, M. ‘Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship’, States, War and Capitalism, (Oxford, 1988) 188-209.
Lash, S, ‘Coercion as Ideology: the German Case’, (in) ‘Dominant Ideologies’, ed. by N. Abercrombie et al., (London, 1990).
Huntington, S. P. ‘Political Modernization: America vs. Europe’, World Politics, vol. 18, (1966), 378-414, and Huntington, S. P. ‘How Countries Democratize’, Political Science Quarterly, vol.106, (1991), 579-616.
Brown, B. M. Models in Political Economy, (London, 1995), 183-231; Sochor, Z.A. Soviet Taylorism Revisited, Soviet Studies, XXXIII (2), (1981), 246-264.
Skocpol, T. States and Social Revolutions, (Cambridge, 1979), 3-4.
Hobsbawm, E. Echoes of Marsailles, (1990), 34.
Ibid., 34.
Held, D. Models of Democracy, 2nd Edition, Polity Press, (Cambridge, 1996).
Moore, B. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Penguin, (London, 1991).
Kedourie points out the fact that pan-Arabic, republican and socialist ideas in the Middle East were mainly shaped under the European intellectual influences: Kedourie, E. Politics in the Middle East, (Oxford, 1992) 291-325.